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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 02-4508
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
JUANITA BROWN,
Appellant
____________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 02-cr-00051)
District Court Judge: Hon. Mary A. McLaughlin

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 9, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER,* District Judge.
(Opinion Filed March 17, 2004)

*

The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
1

______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________________
OBERDORFER, District Judge:
Juanita Brown appeals from her conviction pursuant to a plea agreement. Brown
argues that her trial level counsel’s performance was ineffective in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss
her appeal.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brown pleaded guilty to one count of making false
statements and representations to federally licensed firearms dealers in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). Following a hearing, the district court imposed a prison term of
21 months and a supervised release term of three years.
On appeal, Brown argues that her counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing
was constitutionally ineffective because her counsel stipulated to the applicability of a
two-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) (obliterated serial number), and failed
to object to the application of a two-level adjustment under USSG § 3(C)1.1 (obstruction
of justice). However, “we have stated repeatedly that Sixth Amendment claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel should ordinarily be raised in a collateral proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United Sates v. Jake, 281
F.3d 123, 132 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Thornton,
327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is preferable that such claims be considered on
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collateral review rather than on direct appeal.”) (citing Massaro v. United States, 123 S.
Ct. 1690 (2003). 2
The rationale underlying this rule is that “‘[w]hen an ineffective-assistance claim
is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record
not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often
incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.’” Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272 (quoting
Massaro, 123 S. Ct. at 1694). In contrast, the district court is well-positioned to receive
evidence that develops the record on the issues germane to a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Moreover, “‘the § 2255 motion often will be ruled upon by the
same district judge who presided at trial. The judge, having observed the earlier trial,
should have an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness of counsel’s
conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial.’” Id.
Our preference for ineffective assistance claims being raised in the first instance in
a habeas petition to the district court is sufficiently strong that recently, in a case where
the “[g]overnment concede[d] defense counsel’s error,” Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272
(emphasis supplied), we nonetheless denied the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance
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“We have noted an exception to this practice where the Sixth Amendment claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is predicated on an actual showing of conflict of
interest between the attorney and the accused as apparent from the face of the record.”
Jake, 281 F.3d at 132 n.7 (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125,
133-34 (3d Cir. 1984)). We need not decide whether that exception is still viable in light
of Massaro, 123 S. Ct. 1690, because even if it is, Brown advances no arguments
concerning conflict of interest.
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of counsel, though “without prejudice to his right to raise th[e] claim on a collateral attack
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 273. Brown identifies no reason why this
outcome is not appropriate here. Accordingly, we will dismiss Brown’s appeal without
prejudice to her right to raise a claim for ineffective assistance in a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to the district court.

